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Abstract
Since the reform of the Structural Funds in 1989, the EU has made the principle of
cohesion one of its key policies. Much of the language of European cohesion policy
eschews the idea of trade-offs between efficiency and equity, suggesting it is possible
to maximize overall growth while also achieving continuous convergence in out-
comes and productivity across Europe’s regions. Yet, given the rise in inter-regional
disparities, it is unclear that cohesion policy has altered the pathway of development
from what would have occurred in the absence of intervention. This article draws on
geographical economics, institutionalist social science and endogenous growth
theory, with the aim of providing a fresh look at cohesion policy. By highlighting a
complex set of potential trade-offs and interrelations – overall growth and efficiency;
inter-territorial equity; territorial democracy and governance capacities; and social
equity within places – it revisits the rationale of cohesion policy, with particular
attention to the geographical dynamics of economic development.
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Introduction
Economic activity is unevenly distributed across space. At different territorial
scales – from the world, to among Member States of the EU, and within them
– there are conspicuous gaps in wealth, in the density of population and
economic activity, and in the compositions of regional and national econo-
mies. Since the early 1980s, the EU has witnessed parallel processes of
cross-national convergence, with countries in the original periphery of
Europe catching up, and within country divergence, characterized by rising
relative incomes in well-off regions. A number of studies have demonstrated
that inter-regional disparities have grown since the 1980s, measured in terms
of GDP per capita and employment (cf. Puga, 1999; Martin, 2000; Midelfart-
Knarvik and Overman, 2002; Overman and Puga, 2002; Puga, 2002). The
standard deviation of per capita GDP (EU-15 = 100) for Member States as a
whole has declined from 12.5 in 1990 to 11.4 in 2000, but that same index
increased from 26.5 to 28.5 for sub-national regions within Member States.
Since the reform of the Structural Funds in 1989, the EU has made the
principle of cohesion – of reducing disparities in economic outcome and
opportunity among European regions – one of its key policies. In the context
of rapidly changing economic, demographic and political realities in the EU,
cohesion policy has become an ever larger component of the EU budget. The
funds made available to support cohesion objectives have more than doubled
in real terms since the late 1980s, making it now the greatest area of com-
mitment within the EU budget. For the period 2007–13, €347 billion (at
current prices) has been allocated for cohesion funds, more than 80 per cent
of which is targeted at promoting ‘convergence’.1
Much of the language of European cohesion policy eschews the idea of
trade-offs between efficiency and equity, suggesting it is possible to maximize
overall growth while also achieving convergence in outcomes and productiv-
ity across Europe’s regions. Yet, given the rise in inter-regional disparities, it
is unclear that cohesion policy has altered the pathway of development from
what would have occurred in the absence of intervention.2 The reasons for this
are complex and while some of them may have to do with the procedures for
implementation of convergence policies or perhaps the scale of intervention
1 Source: Commission, DG Region; see «http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/fonds/index_en.htm».
2 Much research effort has gone into answering the question of whether European regional development
intervention has met its objectives, with little clarity resulting. Recent analyses reach widely differing
conclusions. While some studies find that the EU development effort since the 1989 reform of the
Structural Funds has had almost no impact (e.g. Boldrin and Canova, 2001; Dall’Erba and Le Gallo, 2007),
others indicate that it has been a success (e.g. Cappelen et al., 2003). In between there are those who point
out that the impact of the Structural Funds has been limited (e.g. Bussoletti and Esposti, 2004), mixed (e.g.
Puigcerver-Peñalver, 2007) or tends to vary according to differences in emphasis across development axes
(Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2004) or from one geographical location to another (Percoco, 2005).
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(e.g. in comparison to equivalent US federal policies), others may well have
to do with the absence of a realistic view of the economic geography of
development and hence of the possibilities, constraints and potential trade-
offs faced by efforts to promote convergence.
Thus, any fresh look at cohesion policy would be well advised to recon-
sider a complex set of potential trade-offs and interrelations: overall growth
and efficiency; inter-territorial equity; territorial democracy and governance
capacities; and social equity within places.
I. The Sources of Growth and the Tendency towards Agglomeration
For much of the period between the 1960s and the 1980s, the theories of trade
and integration deployed to explain the geographical pattern of economic
development tended to ignore the possibility that such development would
cluster strongly in certain places (cities and regions, and within certain coun-
tries), and generate long-run income divergence. The neoclassical and
Heckscher-Ohlin models emphasized the dispersion of economic activity,
according to the principle of comparative advantage, and economic conver-
gence, through subsequent adjustment of factor proportions in different
places. The predictions of these theories found some empirical support within
Europe and the US: the post-war decades witnessed widespread economic
convergence both at the national and at the regional level (Barro, 1991).
However, the evidence for the usefulness of such theories was weaker at
wider territorial scales, such as in relations between highly developed and
much less developed countries and regions. And indeed, some development
economists in the 1950s and 1960s (e.g. Myrdal, 1957; Hirschman, 1958)
emphasized that economic activity had ‘circular and cumulative’ patterns.
Some economists attempted to reconcile these two perspectives by arguing
that areas such as western Europe or North America represented selective
convergence processes, or ‘convergence clubs’, where convergence would be
possible among economies with similar ‘structural’ characteristics (Quah,
1996; López-Bazo et al., 1999). A more complex picture emerges at wider
territorial scales (such as, for example, the world, or eastern–western
Europe), where underlying structural capacities of economies are quite dif-
ferent. To complicate matters further, since the late 1980s – and especially
since the beginning of the 1990s – there appears to be a trend towards
widening within country (i.e. cross-regional) disparities (Rodríguez-Pose,
1999; Puga, 2002). Economic integration is unleashing forces benefiting core
regions within countries, often to the detriment of the periphery. This is
happening virtually all over the world, with large cities in China, India,
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Australia, Japan, Brazil, Mexico and elsewhere experiencing more rapid,
sustained growth than medium-sized cities and rural hinterlands (Kanbur and
Venables, 2005). Europe is typical, and large cities have generally outper-
formed other regions both within and outside their national boundaries. This
is the case for London, Paris, the Randstad, Madrid, Rome, the Scandinavian
capitals, Dublin and most other capitals in Europe. In sum, while integration
in the EU to date has promoted inter-national convergence, sub-national
inter-regional inequalities have tended to increase.
Research suggests these trends are driven by:
1. the technological paradigm driving growth, and especially innovation and
its geography;
2. geographical integration of markets, combined with greater organizational
and geographical fragmentation of production;
3. the persistence of institutional differences between places despite
integration.
In this light, tendencies towards the geographical agglomeration of certain
types of activities are likely to continue for the foreseeable future. This
generates powerful tendencies toward income divergence, between ‘core
regions’ (i.e. those regions within which are located the largest economic
agglomerations) and ‘peripheries’ (i.e. regions generally lacking similar
agglomerations and often the potential to generate scale economies). Though
there are also powerful forces for convergence operating at the same time –
notably the organizational fragmentation and geographical de-localization of
production, as well as improvement in institutions in peripheral areas – they
may not be powerful enough to counteract divergence. The ‘spread’ of devel-
opment may be thus overwhelmed by the ‘backwash’ of income effects (big
home markets) and technology effects (core regions move up the technologi-
cal ladder faster than backward regions can catch up) (Myrdal, 1957). To our
knowledge, a half-century of more sophisticated trade and location models
has not overturned this fundamental geographical logic of development.
As noted, however, great progress has been made in understanding the
mechanisms of geographical development processes since the 1950s. Three
such academic efforts to understand the persistence of development to
generate core and periphery regions are most relevant in this regard.
The first are ‘new economic geography’ models, which emphasize how
market integration, scale economies, transport costs and home market effects
combine to favour the concentration of economic activity in ‘core’ regions,
and how the advantages of large, flexible, highly specialized labour markets
and localized technological spillovers reinforce these tendencies (Krugman,
1991; Fujita et al., 1999).
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Secondly, models grounded in endogenous growth theory, including inno-
vation economics (Schumpeterian growth theories), focus on innovation – the
outward movement of the technological frontier and the ongoing extension of
quality ladders and ‘product spaces’, and the positions of territories relative
to this frontier (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988; Grossman and Helpman, 1991;
Aghion and Howitt, 2005). These models stress change and adaptive effi-
ciency rather than the adjustment towards an optimal, equilibrium allocation
of factors between places. The economy is seen as a restless search for new
products and processes with high rates of return, but where the potential to do
this is unevenly distributed across territories. There is considerable empirical
evidence in favour of this position, indicating that high factor cost areas,
such as the core regions of the EU, are increasingly specialized at the top of
‘quality ladders’ (products with high knowledge and technology content as
well as advanced producer services) and that their exports correlate well to
the areas in which they innovate (Patel and Pavitt, 1991). Thus, economic
geography and growth economics both emphasize innovation and processes
of learning – knowledge creation and assimilation. They come together in that
the human capital necessary to innovate operates through networks of knowl-
edge transmission and training. This has important spatial implications since
the transaction costs of transmitting knowledge remain high, often involving
face-to-face contact, defined institutional channels and long periods to build
up these channels.
A third school of research argues that institutions are the key force in
determining where a region is situated with respect to the technology frontier,
because institutions shape the ability of an economy to use and develop its
resources. These institutional factors can also contribute to the agglomeration
of economic activity, insofar as institutional capacities are unevenly distrib-
uted, reinforcing the concentration of the most advanced activities in metro-
politan settings in particular, and in highly developed countries in general.
One important set of institutions are those facilitating innovation R&D,
venture capital financing and business support/facilitation; these are known
collectively as ‘systems of innovation’ (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993). A
certain economic scale is required to sustain such a range of institutions;
moreover, only certain regions have the capacity to develop or attract the
human capital and other resources needed to maintain such institutions at
sufficient levels of quality. Second, as good institutional conditions are often
hard to replicate, even mobile investments in innovation-oriented activities
tend to concentrate where these favourable institutional conditions are found.
On the other side, institutional weaknesses, stemming from lack of knowl-
edge, capacity or the protection of existing rents, may result in political
coalitions holding back appropriate institutional development, and policies
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inappropriate for sustaining innovation and growth given their position rela-
tive to different types of frontiers (i.e. institutional, educational and, above
all, the world technological frontier) (Persson et al., 1997; Grossman and
Helpman, 2001; Acemoglu, 2006; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2006).
The geography of cores and peripheries is the combined result of agglom-
eration tendencies, the uneven geography of innovation, the process of geo-
graphical fragmentation of production and the recursive feedbacks of these
forces to the geography of institutional capacities. At any given moment, we
may think of a stylized picture of three different ‘places’ depending on
their position relative to the world technology frontier (Aghion and Howitt,
2005, p. 7):
• places at or near the frontier: characterized by high levels of skilled labour
and access to capital, with few institutional and cultural barriers to devel-
oping and adopting new technologies; these tend to be core regions;
• places further from the frontier: characterized by a lower mix of skilled (vs
unskilled) labour and/or limited access to capital; may face barriers to
adopting and assimilating technology due to human capital, institutional
and/or cultural constraints; these are possible near-term transition zones in
the geographical division of labour;
• places far from the frontier: characterized by high concentrations of
unskilled labour, limited access to capacity, low productivity and substan-
tial cultural and institutional barriers to adopting technology; these are
more often located in the periphery.
The locations of countries and regions relative to the different technology,
educational, institutional and other types of frontiers vary substantially on a
global scale; this is also the case within the EU, which has a mosaic of
positions relative to the technological/quality ladder hierarchy. In the EU, this
tends to play out within an urban–regional hierarchy, exhibiting strong met-
ropolitanization effects. Close to the frontier we find mainly metro regions or
regions adjacent to major metro areas. Other metro areas, often secondary
cities within national urban systems, tend to be further from the frontier.
Finally, lower-income regions, mainly located in the periphery, remain gen-
erally far from the technology frontier. There also appears to be a macro-
geography to this, with core–periphery patterns nested at both the national
and European levels. Metropolitan areas within northern and western Europe,
which benefit from being geographically closer to the economic centre of
Europe, tend to be closer to the frontier than those in southern and eastern
Europe which are located further from the largest European agglomerations.
This indicates that agglomeration and comparative advantages forces are at
work over various, overlapping scales. Within the EU, there is a tendency for
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innovation and economic output to concentrate in the economic core; within
countries concentration is in the existing core regions; and within regions,
there is a tendency to concentrate in urban areas.
A final point can now be made, which brings this discussion back
into a temporal context. From the 1960s to the 1980s, it appeared to some
researchers that convergence processes then in evidence – known as ‘club
convergence’ – would slowly but surely gain ground at wider and wider
spatial scales. But the major structural change in the world economy in the
1980s seems to have increased the importance of innovation for economic
growth, and with it powerful trends towards agglomeration at various spatial
scales, and with that, the importance of spatially uneven distribution of
institutional capacities to innovate. The result is the ‘backwash’ that has been
in evidence recently, in the form of complex, and stubborn, spatial hierarchy
of incomes, within Europe and at the world scale.
II. Is there a Conflict between Efficiency and Convergence?
We have noted that, even though there are indeed forces for convergence
unleashed by integration, there are also many forces pushing in the other
direction. It is precisely this notion that underlies the call for policies encour-
aging convergence or inter-territorial equity within the EU. But, as should
also be clear, such policies are not only costly, but may also have unintended
effects.
Agglomeration is generally good for economic growth and development
because it is the privileged geographical form taken by economic systems
which carry out extensive innovation (World Bank, 2009). The link between
innovation and agglomeration tends to be self-reinforcing: innovative activi-
ties tend towards agglomeration; and the greater the economic agglomeration,
the greater the potential for innovation, for knowledge spillovers and for
higher levels of economic growth. Excessive equality may thus be detrimental
for economic growth if it involves limiting the productivity- and innovation-
enhancing effects of agglomeration; some degree of inter-regional inequality
may therefore raise the overall rate of growth. Regional inequalities in the EU
are higher than those found in the US, but also significantly lower than those
found in most countries in the developing world (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill,
2004). Agglomerations do generate spillovers, both in terms of economic
multipliers and, critically, the spread of knowledge; however, these exhibit
spatial selectivity and suffer from strong distance-decay effects (Audretsch
and Feldman, 2004). Thus, most spillovers tend to accrue to regions sur-
rounding cutting-edge metropolitan areas. Knowledge spillovers to other
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metropolitan areas arise, where they are well networked (including physical
transport and communications links, as well as links within firm and industry
production chains) as part of an integrated urban system. But the scope for
this is limited. Even within highly developed countries, sparsely populated
regions are unlikely to benefit from the knowledge spillovers generated at the
core, as they lack the connections to access them, the capacity to assimilate
them and the scale to enable them to function through the formation of local
agglomerations. For similar reasons peripheral regions at the European-wide
scale are unlikely to capture a significant share of the spillovers resulting from
agglomerations in the European core, except for cities at the top of their urban
hierarchies.
Inequalities in growth across regions may not be harmful in the short term,
as long as growth across all regions is robust. In a ‘race to the top’ scenario
even the losers may be better off than when the race began. Thus, in an
analogy to ‘gains to trade’, agglomeration (as a geographical expression of
specialization) may indeed be essential to maximizing overall output, but the
distribution of those gains may be uneven. There are, of course, limits on the
degree to which agglomeration contributes to greater growth. Particularly as
agglomerations seem to occur in metropolitan environments where space may
be limited (and in the European context at least, there has generally been a
strong consensus in favour of containing the spread of metropolitan growth),
they also create diseconomies (Duranton and Puga, 2000). These manifest
themselves in congestion (time), housing costs (with knock-on implications
for wages and other inputs) and environmental degradation. Yet on the whole,
the evidence points to a positive association between agglomeration and
economic growth (Bourguignon and Morrison, 2002). This suggests that if
Europe is to remain competitive in a more integrated world, and if Europe is
to become more of an innovative ‘first mover’ in the global economy, agglom-
eration may be the geographical underpinning of so doing. Indeed, compari-
sons of the economic geography of the EU to that of the US show that Europe
has fewer and smaller specialized agglomerations than the US, and many
scholars believe this difference enhances the US’ ability to dominate new,
innovative sectors of the world economy (Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman,
2002; Crescenzi et al., 2007).
In this light, it is urgent that Europe get a more precise handle on the
potential trade-offs involved in pursuing goals of growth and innovation and
those of convergence and equity. There is likely an analogy to the models used
to assess the overall benefits of regional integration in a world economy: if
convergence is pursued via policies attempting to spread existing economic
activity, there will be a complex set of ‘creation’ benefits (linkages of poorer
to richer regions, with positive effects on output and income), there will be
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trade ‘diversion’ costs (costs of de-agglomeration and loss of comparative
advantage optimization) and there will be complex dynamic, endogenous
feedbacks of the two (terms of trade effects as poorer regions enter the
economy, especially, which may actually favour the richer regions in the
end). In any case, the overall costs and benefits of convergence-through-
redistribution strategies require much more careful estimation and the results
may turn out to be counter-intuitive (Dupont and Martin, 2003; Martin, 2005)
and Europe needs to have a much more scientifically rigorous approach
to theorizing and measuring such effects as it considers such policies. At
present, we do not have sufficiently precise data to determine the ‘right’ target
levels of these two complex phenomena in interaction, especially because
doing anything to change either of them involves opportunity costs for the
other if it requires significant redistribution of resources. This is therefore a
major open area for policy research and formulation.
III. Reframing the Question
A more interesting question, however, is suggested when we move beyond
this way of conceptualizing the relationship between equity and development.
Indeed, while agglomeration forces may restrict the potential for convergence
across regions, they do not explain fully the gap in productive output between
leading and lagging3 regions in the EU. Many lagging regions are not simply
failing to maintain the pace of growth and development being achieved in
leading regions, they are failing to make productive use of the resources
available. This is the problem of persistent (or durable) underdevelopment –
i.e. of regions producing consistently below their production possibilities
frontier. The more thorny question has to do with whether such certain uneven
geographical patterns of development can have potentially perverse dynamic
structural effects, by which we mean they lead to divergent capacities to
engage in development between developed and less developed regions,
thereby contributing to the problem of underdevelopment. In more conven-
tional terms, ‘capacities’ refers to the probability that a place will be able to
adjust its use of factors to move up the technology frontier or product space,
and ‘divergent capacities’ exist when there are durable differences in the rate
at which this can be done by different territories. Such structural inequalities,
for example, would become circular and cumulative when skilled human
capital emigrates to leading regions, weakening innovative capacities in
3 Defined here as regions with per capita GDP substantially below the EU average and/or regions with
output and employment levels well below the EU average.
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lagging regions, leading to adverse selection effects for the existing popula-
tion and for political behaviours and institutions, in a ‘vicious circle’ scenario.
This idea is not new, but it carries with it a steep methodological challenge,
which is twofold. On one hand, it would require a more precise definition
of the probabilities that a place will, or will not, move up the technology
frontier/product space, and over what type of time horizon. On the other hand,
it would require identifying whether active intervention could improve these
probabilities, and precisely how it would improve capacities to move up the
technological frontier/product space, and which such capacities are amenable
to improvement with intervention.
IV. Sources of Underdevelopment of Capacities
The underdevelopment of capacities stems from a range of factors, the rela-
tive importance of which will vary across regions. Endogenous and Schum-
peterian growth models point to problems of low levels of human capital and
low capacity to innovate and assimilate innovations as factors limiting growth
potential. New economic geography models emphasize insufficient scale and
poor accessibility to markets. Other lines of thinking underline the gap in
technological and innovation capacities between regions, sometimes attri-
buted to differences in human capital levels, others to differences in structural
R&D/science capacity, and others to the quality of firms and entrepreneur-
ialism. Still others consider that these differences might be generated, in the
long run, by differences in the quality of their economic, social and political
institutions. Much of the recent research on economic growth identifies insti-
tutions as a fundamental determinant of a region’s or a nation’s economic
growth trajectory. Many lagging areas are beset by problems of institutional
sclerosis, clientelism, corruption and pervasive rent-seeking by durable local
elites who have an incentive to block innovation (Acemoglu and Robinson,
2000). Informal institutions in these places are often similarly dysfunctional,
resulting in low levels of trust and declining associative capacity, and restrict-
ing the potential for effective collective action. In such an environment where
institutions are ‘inappropriate’, a region is likely to fail to break out of low
growth and low productivity traps. Weak institutions may have negative
influence on the provision of public goods and on the development and
delivery of policies aimed at improving skills or innovation capacity, or other
potential sources of growth.
Such an environment of inappropriate institutions tends to have cumula-
tive effects, leading to vicious circles of low growth. The poor conditions for
investment in lagging regions may lead to a further concentration of economic
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activity in already existing development poles, exacerbating trends toward
divergence. And increasing levels of divergence often contribute to under-
mine an already weak institutional capacity and quality in lagging regions,
entrenching underdevelopment.
V. From Theory to Logics of Intervention
In light of the above, it can now be seen that there are two different challenges
to be faced by cohesion policy. The first relates to ‘unevenness’ and the fact
that the factors driving economic growth appear to have a tendency towards
agglomeration, concentrating growth in core, metropolitan regions at the
expense of less populated and peripherally located ones. The second relates to
‘persistent underdevelopment’, which has a number of endogenous causes,
including the inability to generate agglomeration as well as a tendency
towards poor institutional environments.
In looking at the reasons for intervention to address unevenness and
durable underdevelopment, it is useful to remember that cohesion policy has
historically been assigned three objectives: equity (essentially equality of
economic outcome and opportunity through redistribution), growth (reducing
the underutilization of resources) and legitimacy (promoting and preserving
the legitimacy of the EU and its institutions). These create a complex EU
policy field with a certain number of objectives that are not necessarily
mutually consistent:
(1) Promoting growth versus reducing underdevelopment as policy
objectives: perhaps it is most difficult to justify the need of a cohesion
policy on the grounds of reducing inter-regional inequalities. Since promot-
ing higher levels of growth may require accepting geographical concentra-
tion of economic activity, generally in the best-endowed regions, there are
likely to be trade-offs between aggregate economic efficiency and promot-
ing convergence.
(2) Reducing underdevelopment in a growth-enhancing way – develop-
ment of capacities: the case for intervention to respond to persistent under-
development has to do principally with the imperfect state of European
integration, involving barriers to labour and capital mobility. In the absence of
significant internal labour mobility, it becomes more difficult for underdevel-
oped regions to lower their unemployment rates, especially as labour mobility
is more limited for the less skilled, leading to a combination of brain drain and
underemployment/unemployment for the worst-off regions. Though capital
mobility has increased, it is highest for activities relatively far away from the
technological frontier, amenable to fragmentation and long-distance trade,
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and biased toward the use of less-skilled labour. Close to the frontier, embed-
dedness in innovation networks limits spatial mobility to circulation and
integration principally among the already developed regions. Taken together,
the potential for aggregate growth in the EU may be prejudiced by resulting
underdevelopment. While the EU may want to take action to promote
increased labour mobility, this is likely to take a long time to bear fruit and it
may never reach North American levels. Increasing the innovative capacities
of less innovative regions will require policies that go beyond mere opening
of borders. The policy concerns of enhancing growth in underdeveloped
regions (as opposed to the aggregate growth of the EU as a whole) and
combating underdevelopment of these regions have some overlap, but once
again, the opportunity costs to aggregate EU growth and welfare require
careful assessment.
(3) Social development: within the EU there is widespread consensus to
provide a certain standard of living and public service provision to all citi-
zens; welfare is widely considered to consist not just of income levels, or
aggregate income, but of satisfaction of basic needs.
(4) Political stability: the presence of persistent and perhaps growing
territorial inequalities has been the source of political tensions within many
Member States of the EU.
(5) Legitimacy of the EU: persistent underdevelopment is considered by
some to weaken the legitimacy of the EU, as it would indicate a failure to
deliver on some of its core objectives to enhance the welfare of all its
citizens.
VI. The Risks of Intervention
A provisional case for intervention to address underdevelopment in a growth-
enhancing way seems to emerge from existing theory and evidence, but this
does not mean that it is costless or free of risk. Among the main risks a
cohesion policy should consider are the potential for interventions to:
• distort the efficient functioning of markets in the regions by favouring
investments in activities inappropriate given the region’s location
relative to the technology frontier. This is particularly likely where
regions adopt policies not based on localized sources of comparative
advantage and/or where they attempt to replicate wholesale that which
has been successful in other regions (e.g. the plethora of would-be
‘Silicon Valleys’);
• crowd out private investment, leaving the region vulnerable to fall back into
decline once public funding dries up;
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• shelter regions from markets, rendering them ever less able to adapt to
changing external conditions;
• create a dependency culture, where in the name of generating ‘structural
change’, regions come to rely on transfers and experience convergence in
consumption but persistent divergence in productive output and potential;
• entrench existing elites by propping up ineffective, clientelistic institutions
and fuelling rent-extracting machines.
In addition, interventions – particularly those designed to generate innovative
and adaptive growth – tend to be often vague, providing a blanket authoriza-
tion for spending on a wide range of – often ineffectual and poorly monitored
– programmes and projects. It is therefore critical that the objectives of
addressing underdevelopment in a growth-enhancing way be sharply distin-
guished from: (a) convergence policies; (b) policies to address underdevel-
opment that have few community-wide growth-enhancing effects; (c) policies
for social cohesion and meeting basic needs, that have few growth-enhancing
properties. These are fundamentally different policy objectives.
VII. What is Appropriate Intervention? Types of Territories,
Types of Intervention
Addressing underdevelopment in a growth-enhancing way necessarily
requires basing policies on the many and varied types of underdevelopment
dynamics to be found in the EU’s regions. In other words, it cannot be done
via a ‘one size fits all’ policy framework or mechanically applied criteria for
intervention. There are major challenges to specify new criteria for interven-
tion on underdevelopment and with the goal of building capacities that can
enhance growth. To see this in more depth, we need to identify different types
of territories, as well as different aims of intervention.
Different types of regions may be classified (broadly) as:
• metropolitan regions at the core of the EU;
• metropolitan regions in peripheral and less developed regions of the EU;
• regions adjacent to metropolitan regions;
• peripheral regions with relatively large populations and urban centres;
• rural and peripheral regions with sparse populations.
Different aims of intervention might include:
• enhancing growth for the EU as a whole, possibly by supporting efficiency
and innovation in leading agglomerations;
• spreading innovation/growth by facilitating spatial spillovers and linkages
to highly developed places;
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• promoting innovation/growth in certain non-core regions deemed to have
real medium-term potential to move up the technology hierarchy/product
space;
• addressing underdevelopment through a combination of transfers, public
goods provision and institutional reform, in order to enhance long-term
growth capacity of these regions, whose potential for moving up the
innovation/product quality hierarchy is limited, but potential for increasing
productivity is nonetheless considerable;
• addressing equity for regions with limited potential to increase innovation
or productivity, while admitting that it might have trade-offs (in the form of
opportunity costs) to EU-wide growth and efficiency.
Thus, in the latter two categories, territorially targeting many policies that
promote growth or combat certain dimensions of underdevelopment may lead
to lower aggregate growth, but a different territorial and social distribution of
growth. If the aim of policy is to maximize economic growth, there is a case
for intervention designed to improve the potential of individuals and firms,
including in the wealthiest regions. Beyond this, many growth-enhancing
policies should not be territorially targeted. Many of the institutional factors
that facilitate innovation and growth are best enabled at the national level, or
in some cases the EU level. These include tax policies for R&D, laws and
frameworks governing firm start-ups, venture capital markets, bankruptcy
laws, cultures of success and failure, reforms of R&D and research systems,
overall educational expenditures; in short, many of the factors that encompass
national (and EU) systems of innovation (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993). In
other words, the paradox is that policies for both enhancing overall growth
and combating underdevelopment may better be achieved in a non-spatially
targeted way. This, in combination with policies that reduce barriers to the
mobility of capital and labour, should lead to firms and individuals being able
to make better choices of productivity- or innovation-enhancing locations.
The results of this type of intervention may vary across the EU. In old
Member States the likely result would be to reinforce inter-national conver-
gence within western Europe but to reproduce inter-regional differences. New
Member States that have successful agglomerations would probably enjoy
a certain convergence tendency with EU averages, but this may come at the
price of exacerbating inter-regional inequalities. In contrast, new members
without the medium-term probability of building core innovative regions are
likely to have slower growth in their (sub-national) inter-regional inequalities,
but lower overall convergence, if at all, towards the EU average.
However, in the cases of both growth promotion and reduction of under-
development, it might be that delivery of general-purpose policies will be
1102 THOMAS FAROLE, ANDRÉS RODRÍGUEZ-POSE AND MICHAEL STORPER
© 2011 The Author(s)
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
most effective when it involves territorial agencies. This is because many
important institutions, including regional labour markets, education and train-
ing institutions, business associations and chambers of commerce, and indi-
vidual research institutions, function primarily at the regional and local level.
To take the previous example of policies to reform systems of innovation:
many critical reforms must be enacted at large territorial scales; but parts of
their implementation require the involvement of regional and local scales.
Thus, there are two potential roles for regional and local institutions, that
should not be confused: one is as an autonomous policy actor setting local,
context-specific goals (true subsidiarity); the other is as an embedded delivery
system for policies set at higher territorial scales, but cannot be implemented
exclusively from those scales (multi-level governance and implementation).
The task for policy-makers is to understand precisely which interventions are
appropriate at each scale.
From a purely economic point of view, combating underdevelopment to
enhance growth requires a mixture of multi-level governance and true sub-
sidiarity. On economic grounds, the existence of technological and other
types of frontiers means that the implementation of similar measures in
different territories may yield widely varying results. One example of this is
the presence of technological thresholds, below which the benefits of invest-
ments in high-order technologies do not accrue. Regions away from the
technological frontier may thus achieve lower returns on investment in R&D
than metropolitan regions located in the core of Europe. In contrast, periph-
eral regions may achieve greater returns by investing in human capital and in
developing their capacity to assimilate innovations generated elsewhere. On
institutional grounds, the quality of local institutions tends to have a substan-
tial impact on the degree to which interventions achieve their intended out-
comes. Regions with poor institutional settings are ineffective in supporting
innovative activity or assimilating knowledge and innovation. As a result,
policies of development promotion often fail to be implemented correctly; or
worse, rent-seeking elites capture or distort the benefits of the intervention,
entrenching their privileged positions and exacerbating inequalities within the
region. Arguably the EU may have been wasting money by giving, under the
principle of subsidiarity, greater responsibility for cohesion interventions
to institutions that lack the capacity to formulate and/or implement them
effectively, or indeed who are controlled by elites with a disincentive to see
through the changes intended by the interventions.
However, the question of how to intervene in order to improve institutions
is not easy to answer. ‘Institution-building’ is politically appealing and appro-
priate institutions are strongly suggested by theory and evidence as key to
creating the capacities for economic development. The problem is that there
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are few systematic lessons from the literature as to how policy can improve or
build institutions, and indeed, the widespread vagueness about the subject
carries a risk of squandering public funds and effort on programmes that may
have little impact and possibly high opportunity costs. What we do know is
that there are several ways institutions can improve economic performance
and reduce underdevelopment: (a) promoting openness to new ideas and
agents (otherwise known as ‘absorption capacity’); (b) limiting clientelism
and rent-seeking; (c) reducing transaction costs; and (d) under some circum-
stances, changing time horizons to improve ‘staying power’ of parties where
long latency periods are at hand. There is an additional, more controversial
role for institutions, which is (e) changing expectations in the economy, and
breaking out of the ‘adverse selection’ dynamic which can emerge when the
existing state of the economy and its actor networks determine the ‘needs’ to
which institutions address themselves. This is the thorny matter of whether
institutions can transform an economy by looking well beyond its current
development level. Note that objectives (c) and (d) may have a potentially
uncomfortable relationship to objectives (a) and (b). Whereas (a) and (b) are
about newness and openness, (c) and (d) are about staying power and
co-ordination. The problem is that frequently, in Europe, policies favour the
latter and often degenerate into excuses for rent-seeking clientelism. The
utmost care must be taken to define precisely the criteria for different policy
objectives and to ensure this does not happen. We do not have good estimates
of the costs of transforming institutions in sub-national regions, or of raising
capacities of persistently underdeveloped regions. But international evidence
– from research on ‘success stories’ such as Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea,
Israel and Ireland – concludes there are high social rates of return on well-
calibrated efforts in this regard.
Two other possible types of intervention can also be considered, for
opposite points in the ‘opportunity spectrum’. There are certain regions
relatively far from the technology frontier, but that may offer opportunities for
moving up along it. In Europe, this is likely to be certain metropolitan areas
in new Member States, and certain provincial metro areas in the old members.
Institutional change may not suffice to help them realize this potential. Can
sectoral policies – which are essentially a form of industrial policy – comple-
ment institutional change and help these areas fulfil their potential? Targeted
industrial policies have a generally poor record, and more so at the regional
level. But there are cases in international development – notably in east Asian
regions such as Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea – where policies aimed
at ‘jumping the technology queue’ have been successful (Amsden, 1989;
Wade, 1990), so the question naturally poses itself as to whether such
strategies might be applicable to certain EU regions.
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At the opposite end of the opportunity spectrum are those regions that have
little short- or medium-term possibility for moving up the technological
ladder, and which suffer from problems of severe underdevelopment. Insti-
tutional modernization will be a part of the effort in these regions. But the
EU’s other goals may also provide justification for palliative policies such as
income transfers and the provision of public goods that these regions, and
their Member States, are unable to provide for themselves. It should be
considered, however, that such programmes need to avoid creating depen-
dence, clientelism or ‘crowding out’ developmentalist policies from the
agenda and priorities of actors.
A final word on how different forms of equity and cohesion interrelate is
necessary here. Social equity and inter-territorial equity are driven by differ-
ent forces and the one does not map onto the other. Indeed, certain types of
policies promoting inter-territorial equity may contribute to raising overall
levels of inequality between persons, if they redistribute income from persons
in lower income brackets in one place to the population in another, without
changing the overall dynamics of income distribution or even redistributing
income upwards in the social income distribution but horizontally in the
territorial income distribution.
VIII. What Might a More Territorially Nuanced Cohesion Policy
Look Like?
We therefore recommend a cohesion policy consisting of a highly tailored
set of interventions designed to address specific regional contexts of under-
development, on the one hand, and to promote growth, on the other. In
Table 1, the term ‘institutional modernization’ refers to the five ((a) to (e))
goals of institutional reform noted earlier.
Conclusions
The approach to cohesion policy outlined in this article departs from the
traditional approach to cohesion policy in three important ways. Firstly, it
places less emphasis on ‘convergence’ (as defined by reducing the gap in
GDP per capita across regions) and instead focuses on combating under-
development in a way that promotes both local and EU growth. Secondly, it
eschews any idea of a uniform approach to regional development, recognizing
the need to develop interventions tailored to the contexts and needs of specific
regions. Finally, it stresses the importance of building strong networks of
capable institutions in all regions in order to ensure development over the
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Table 1: Towards a Place-Tailored Cohesion Policy
Type of region Likely location vs technological frontier
and agglomeration potential
Nature of interventions
to support EU cohesion
Core metro regions (e.g.
London, Paris, Berlin,
Randstad, Hamburg,
Milan, Copenhagen)
• On/near the technology frontier
• Strong agglomeration force
• Growth promotion (via Lisbon Agenda)
• Facilitating ongoing adjustment and
innovation along the frontier
Regions adjacent to core
metro regions and
secondary metro regions in
the EU’s core (e.g. East
Midlands, Scotland,
Tuscany, Midi-Pyrénées,
Rhône-Alpes, Helsinki)
• Near the technology frontier
• Moderate potential to realize
agglomerations
• Promotion of endogenous innovation
development
• Promotion of integration with core
metro regions
• Improving agglomeration potential
(institutional deepening – e.g.
encouraging venture capital, business
services, R&D institutions)
• Essentially, these are ‘extended
metropolitan basin’ policies
Metro regions (top of urban
hierarchy) in lagging and
peripheral areas (e.g.
Lisbon, Athens, Warsaw,
Bucharest)
• Moderately far from the technology
frontier
• Moderate potential to realize
agglomerations in distinctive
technology fields
• Reasonable home market effect to
promote scale
• Institutional ‘moving up’ – e.g.
encouraging venture capital, business
services, R&D institutions, etc.) –
national level
• Institutional modernization and
deepening – regional level
• Possible targeted sectoral policies
Underdeveloped or
peripheral, often
semi-rural regions
(Calabria, Andalusia,
Ipeiros, Podlaskie)
• Far from the technology frontier
• Limited potential to realize innovative
agglomerations
• Limited home market effect for scale
• Limited potential to generate productive
activity in the short term
• Public goods provision – to facilitate
development and retention of human
capital and home market
• Productivity-enhancing interventions at
the sector/firm level – tailored to
exploiting local sources of comparative
advantage
• Infrastructure connectivity – to link
with leading regions and become
attractive to delocalizing production
activities
• Institutional modernization, especially
for openness and co-ordination
• Attract branch plants and
‘de-agglomerating’ basic
labour-intensive activities
Relatively sparsely populated
rural and peripheral
regions (e.g. Basilicata,
Extremadura, Alentejo,
East Macedonia, Upper
Norrland, Východné
Slovensko)
• Far from the technology frontier
• Limited potential to realize innovative
agglomerations
• Limited home market effect for scale
• Limited potential to generate productive
activity in the short term
• Public goods provision
– Quality (for equity purposes)
– Mobility-promoting (e.g. education,
housing policies that avoid mobility
restrictions)
– Maintain limited home market effects
• Promoting social enterprise/social
entrepreneurship
• Institutional modernization and
deepening for social openness
• Innovation in niche areas suitable to
sparsely populated regions
• Increasing education levels and
connectedness to metropolitan regions
for knowledge transfer and opportunity
recognition
Source: Authors.
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long run. These three challenges to cohesion policy have implications for the
way cohesion policy is governed.
Perhaps most importantly, this approach implies a redefinition by Euro-
pean institutions and Member States and regions of the types of interventions
to be authorized in different cases, the means to do so and the respective roles
of the EU, Member States and sub-national regions.
(1) Defining types of interventions: the trade-offs between growth max-
imization through spatial unevenness and growth enhancement through
combating underdevelopment must be rigorously assessed and defined. Con-
cepts such as ‘adaptive efficiency’, ‘innovation’, ‘productive efficiency’ and
‘growth enhancing development’ require precise definition. A further set of
trade-offs between these objectives and certain kinds of equity objectives –
those necessary to assure consensus minima and to prevent ‘downward
spirals’ – must also be assessed. Criteria that trigger each type of intervention
then would need to be developed.
(2) The means to do so: in all cases, because policies need to be context-
sensitive; their precise content has to be determined through interaction
between the EU and the regions. How, then, to ensure conformity to policy
objectives? Greater conditionality is a must if the EU is to avoid the prob-
lems of elite-capture, rent-seeking, insider–outsider problems, principal–
agent problems or clientelistic and nepotistic practices that may arise in a
more decentralized cohesion policy. Although this may prove problematic at
first, given the EU tradition of conditionality by consent, the EU already
has the powers to impose greater discretion in the allocation of funds and
to generate a credible threat in order to make sure that regions abide by
clear guidelines and follow set practices. Going forward, the ‘credible
threat’ must be shown to be credible.
(3) Conditionality requires effective monitoring and evaluation:
given the diversity of interventions we should expect under this approach, it
is important that the Commission be able to monitor – ex ante, during and
after – the results of interventions, using rigorous criteria preventing the
possibility that greater complexity and flexibility in policy objectives
simply open the Pandora’s box of non-transparency and lead to abuse,
rent-seeking and equivocation. This, in our view, is the greatest danger of
the approach we recommend. In order for this to work, there must be
changes both to the way the Commission functions and, critically, to the
nature of the relationship between the Commission (DG-Regio) and its
Member States and regions, with regard to cohesion policy. There must
also be significant investment in training Commission officials who will
monitor, and national, regional and local officials who will propose and
comply.
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In light of the above, it will be indispensable to couple a substantive
foundation for cohesion policy to new methods of implementation and evalu-
ation. Among the innovative measures that should receive serious consider-
ation for context-sensitive policies of the sort here advocated, we can cite
several. On the new substantive foundation for cohesion policies, measures
could include the establishment of a set of guidelines concerning both insti-
tutions and areas of intervention and a greater capacity by the Commission to
provide technical support to local institutions in the design, development and
implementation of economic development strategies. On the new methods of
implementation and evaluation side a better and leaner monitoring of perfor-
mance through mechanisms such as peer-to-peer mentoring systems or
random project monitoring could help improve the delivery and effectiveness
of intervention. Random audits of performance are another good way to
increase incentives for implementing agencies, and have the advantage of
avoiding special preparation for evaluation. Such audits need to be backed up
by independent auditing authorities, whether within the Commission or in
separate agencies. As a whole, this involves a more thorough development of
a ‘check and balance structure’ permitting the Commission or any designed
independent auditing authority fully to develop its monitoring role without
political meddling, as well as providing regions with a clearer set of guide-
lines of what is expected from the implementation of the policy. Transparency
– ‘sunlight’ – is essential for the smooth running of the system. Finally,
policies could be built around incremental performance incentives rather than
single block grants, such that progress towards objectives could be differen-
tially rewarded. Obviously, audits and investigations should have the ability,
and the incentive, to end policies and grants that are manifestly not reaching
their goals.
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